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1. Introduction
Local government is an integral part of modern democratic states. However, the 
institution of local government may only exist if the obligation to organise pub‑
lic tasks imposed on local governments by the state is accompanied by the sourc‑
es of revenue necessary to finance such tasks. On one hand, local governments 
do enjoy neither their own independent rights, which would challenge the inter‑
ests of the states, nor unlimited autonomy. On the other hand however, real, full 
and effective decentralisation requires a significant degree of financial independ‑
ence for local communities. This independence constitutes a fundamental link 
between the financial decisions of local politicians and their responsibility for the 
consequences. This is a basic prerequisite for effective decentralization and the 
elimination of opportunistic attitudes among local politicians, administrations, 
and decision–makers. 
Effective decentralisation in the political, social and economic spheres de‑
pends on the transfer of certain tax instruments to the local tier. This is currently 
one of the most serious challenges in public policy, as the processes of decentral‑
isation, which have been underway for several decades, and the increase in the 
costs of many public tasks have led to a large disproportion between the public 
tasks delegated to local governments and the revenues in the form of taxes and lo‑
cal fees which can be transferred to the local administration.
This study is both theoretical and empirical in nature. The aim of the discus‑
sion is to analyse and evaluate the theoretical findings in the area of fiscal decen‑
tralization, to indicate doctrinal recommendations and to confront such recom‑
mendations with the trends in the practice of local government finances in Poland 
and selected Central and Eastern European countries. The analysis of the specific 
gap between the principles of fiscal decentralisation and the directions of public 
finance in practice makes it possible to draw conclusions related to the negative 
consequences of incomplete decentralisation, and to formulate recommendations 
de lege ferenda. The article uses both Polish and foreign literature on the subject 
as well as studies by international institutions. The theoretical considerations were 
supplemented with data from Eurostat and the European Commission. A compar‑
ative analysis was conducted on selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
namely two groups of countries: the Visegrad Group Countries, and the three Bal‑
tic states. All of the seven analysed countries are EU members and they belong 
to the group of unitary countries. 
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2. The need to decentralise public tasks and finance: the first and second 
generation of fiscal federalism
Local government is a direct manifestation of democracy and the decentralised 
form of public decision‑making, the organization of public tasks, and their financ‑
ing (Gajl 1993, p. 12). However, a widely understood decentralisation of the gov‑
ernance system is not a value in and of itself, neither at the microeconomic nor 
macroeconomic levels. The literature points to both various benefits and negative 
consequences of decentralization (Patrzałek 2010, pp. 60–65, Ziółkowska 2005, 
pp. 221–222). However, the literature points out that spending public funds is more 
effective when the administrators of the funds and the implementers of the public 
tasks function close to the local community for the benefit of which they act. Apart 
from a better recognition of the needs, it enables the monitoring of financing de‑
cisions taken by far less anonymous decision‑makers (Owsiak 2017, p. 168). The 
foreign literature, especially in the new political economy, emphasizes the impor‑
tance of the correlation between the quantity of specific goods or services provid‑
ed by the public sector and the level of fees and taxes that residents have to pay for 
these goods and services, the importance of competition between local commu‑
nities, and political conditions for the processes of decentralisation and fiscal de‑
cision‑making (Breton 1996, Buchanan 1997, Stiglitz 2004). Bearing in mind the 
theoretical considerations concerning the advantages, disadvantages and condi‑
tions for decentralisation, it should be stated that in the practical processes of de‑
centralisation we always have to deal with certain choices of the state structure 
along the centralisation – decentralisation axis, which have an impact on the spe‑
cific financial instruments. These choices are conditioned by the consequences 
of the so‑called vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in specific socio‑eco‑
nomic systems (Herber 1979, p. 329).
The views on the scope of decentralisation and the financial tools used in this 
process have evolved. The abundance of long‑standing findings in this field is pri‑
marily connected with the doctrine of fiscal federalism, which distinguishes be‑
tween the so‑called first and second ‘generations’ of this theory (Oates 2005, 
pp. 349–373). The theory of fiscal federalism developed first in those countries 
with a federal system. The unitary states drew upon it while decentralising their 
own public authorities. In its traditional approach, the theory of fiscal federalism 
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. W. E. Oates lists K. Arrow, R. Musgrave and 
P. Samuelson amongst its main proponents. The traditional approach was rather 
naïve, in that the public authorities at different tiers would act only to maximise 
the welfare of their communities. The distribution of public revenue between the 
state and local government should depend on the division of functions between 
the various tiers of government. The first stage is the distribution of tax and qua‑
si‑fiscal revenues between the state and other, higher and lower level, public law 
104 Beata Guziejewska
entities, the so‑called vertical distribution. In the normative approach, this distri‑
bution should be closely linked to the allocation of tasks among the different terri‑
torial communities and the taxes should be allocated to the different tiers accord‑
ing to their structure and economic consequences (Musgrave, Musgrave, 1973, 
pp. 513–539, Hockley 1970, pp. 69–72). Individual taxes existing in a given tax 
system should be distributed among the state, local communities, and other lo‑
cal government units that are present in the vertical organisational structure, tak‑
ing into account primarily the tasks assigned to individual units (Tiebout 1956, 
pp. 416–424). The essence of full and effective fiscal decentralisation is the pro‑
vision to local governments of their so‑called ‘own revenues’ – revenues assigned 
to them by law, which directly affect their budgets and whose selected structural 
elements local government units can shape. Tax revenues should be transferred 
through supreme and/or primary legislation, i.e. the constitution and legislative acts 
adopted by parliament. The vertical distribution of public funds reflects the extent 
to which public tasks and public finances are decentralised (Spahn 1993, p. 71). 
The next supplementary revenue allocation is carried out between the local gov‑
ernment units at the same tier of the territorial organisation of public authority. The 
redistribution of funds may consist in the fact that richer local government units 
transfer part of their own revenues to other, financially weaker, entities. The bur‑
den for individual communes may be equal or different, depending on the adopt‑
ed criteria. Differentiated burdens may be calculated according to the economic 
potential of individual communes or the extent to which the commune makes use 
of the services provided by the municipal association. The problem of subsidising 
territorial self‑government is a vibrant, extensive, and separate section of the the‑
ory of fiscal federalism.
The public choice theory constituted a milestone in a more realistic, normative 
view of fiscal decentralisation, which took into account the role of political pro‑
cesses and the fact that decision‑makers and politicians are opportunists in their 
motivations, striving to maintain power and influence, and generating high wag‑
es for the administration. In other words, they strive to maximize, rather than op‑
timize, public budgets (Brenan, Buchanan 1980, p. 18). Realization of their own 
particular interests was an important element which was taken into account in the 
so‑called ‘second generation’ of fiscal federalism. This was accompanied by the 
issues of asymmetry of information, which characterizes the analysed processes 
of fiscal choices and activity of various lobby groups (Oates 2005, pp. 349–373). 
New Political Economy is an institutional concept of the neoclassical school of eco‑
nomics. Its subject matter is a multidimensional economic analysis of such insti‑
tutions as the state, administration, bureaucratic structure, and the military. The 
representatives of New Political Economy believe that the economy and the insti‑
tution of the state are closely interlinked. In this approach, politics is often treat‑
ed as a specific type of exchange, while politicians are seen as actors – entrepre‑
neurs involved on one side of the exchange. Moreover, it is stressed that economic 
105Normative Versus Positive Approach to Fiscal Decentralisation…
decisions are often politically driven; in the light of the findings of New Political 
Economy, it seems obvious that the conditions for decisions within the public fi‑
nance sector are politically tinged. 
3. Normative and positive theories of public revenue allocation
Undoubtedly the problem of the sources for local government financing is the crux 
of all disputes and discussions devoted to the effective and complete decentrali‑
sation of state finances. The dispute is dichotomous, i.e. it takes place on two lev‑
els. The first level is related to a specific distribution of tasks and public revenues 
between the state and local government. The second level is connected with the 
decisions related to the local government sector itself and the scope of financial 
compensation within this sector. What makes them so difficult is that these pro‑
cesses take place against the background of conflicting priorities of citizens (voters) 
at the state level and the members of individual local communities. The adequacy 
of legally‑assigned public tasks and own revenues (local taxes and fees) is a fun‑
damental guarantee of the real autonomy of local government and a manifestation 
of true decentralization. Adjusting the amount of financial resources, in the form 
of local taxes and compensatory transfers from the state budget, to the tasks and 
competences delegated is a basic prerequisite for the construction of the financial 
system of local governments. In practice, the scope of local taxes is often too small, 
which undermines the essence of local government. The principles of adequacy 
and subsidiarity, which are undisputable in the theory of public finance, are often 
hindered in the process of their practical implementation. 
The theory of fiscal federalism provides a normative approach and some an‑
swers to the question on how public tasks and revenues should be distributed 
among the various levels of public authority. The literature also formulates the 
features that should be fulfilled by the so‑called ideal local tax. Following the tra‑
ditional division of the functions of public finances into allocation, redistribution, 
and stabilisation, both the redistribution and stabilisation functions should remain 
the responsibility of state authorities. This approach excludes the basic element 
of the tax system, i.e. income taxes, which local governments are not allowed 
to levy. Local taxation should include taxes levied on a relatively immobile tax 
base; the tax base should be distributed evenly between different territorial units; 
and the sources of local taxes should be relatively stable over time and fiscally effi‑
cient (Ahmad, Brosio (ed.) 2015, pp. 239250). The catalogue of model features that 
an ideal local tax should have is quite comprehensive. R. Bird (1993, pp. 207–227) 
lists, for example, the following elements: 
• the tax should be levied by local authorities;
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• local authorities should have the autonomy to determine the tax rate; 
• the tax should be collected at the local level and should directly contribute 
to the local government budget. 
Bird also stresses the importance of the principle of benefits in local finance 
systems, and therefore underscores the importance of fees for goods and services 
as a crucial source of local budgeting in the context of decentralisation.
P. Swianiewicz (2004, pp. 43–46) lists the following as the features of local tax‑
es which are particularly important in the case of local government financing: 
• efficiency appropriate for the tasks;
• a balanced spatial distribution of the tax base;
• territorial clarity;
• a stable spatial relationship of the tax base;
• “transparency” of the tax;
• flexibility in relation to inflation;
• a common tax burden and simplicity of the local tax system.
Although considered a traditional source of local income, property taxes are 
insufficient to finance the numerous and costly public tasks delegated to local gov‑
ernments. Therefore, the literature suggests that consumption and turnover taxes 
should be used as an effective source of financing local budgets. In these propos‑
als, VAT could be used as an independent source of revenue for the state budget 
and local governments, or as a form of common tax (the so‑called Dual VAT, 
CVAT or VIVAT), highlighting at the same time both the many advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these instruments and solutions (Bird, Gendron 2000, 
pp. 753–761). The various advantages and disadvantages of the central and local 
tax administrations in relation to all taxes are also important. 
While the recommendations springing from the theory are clear, as is the 
postulate to make the income of local communities more realistic, there remains 
the question of why, in practice, transfers of various forms play such an important 
role in the systems of financing local governments. And why do local taxes play 
an increasingly marginal role? Apart from an obvious issue of financial equalisa‑
tion (subsidies and grants), the so‑called ‘shares’ in state taxes (tax sharing) are 
in practice quite often used as a source of revenue. One of the most frequently 
stressed issues in the literature promoting full fiscal decentralisation concerns the 
limitations on transferring full taxing authority to local governments while en‑
suring uniformity of the tax system across the country (Kornberger‑Sokołowska, 
2001, p. 165). S. Owsiak (2017, p. 175) draws attention to a similar aspect, stating 
that the vast majority of public revenues are taken over by the state, as for many 
decades the central tax authority has been dominant. The basic reason for this is the 
fundamental importance of tax policy for the economy and society. Nevertheless, 
political and power‑related issues cannot be overlooked. 
In the traditional literature (Oates 1998, p. 633), shares in state taxes are treat‑
ed as a kind of general transfer from the state budget. They need to be collected 
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in this budget and then to be allocated according to the rules that are adopted. 
As in the case of typical subsides, local governments are free to spend funds that 
come from shares in taxes. Sometimes subsidies are similar in nature to shares. 
This is the case when, in order to guarantee a certain level of transfer, its total 
amount is related to a percentage of state budget revenue from taxes, either in to‑
tal or to specific taxes.
The system of the so‑called ‘pure’ shares of local government in state tax‑
es is based on the fact that the shares transferred are calculated pro rata to the 
amount of taxes paid by the inhabitants of a given territorial unit. In such a solu‑
tion, local authorities have no control over the level of shares or the design 
of the taxes in which the shares are established, even though the source of the 
tax is located in the jurisdiction of the unit concerned. The literature describes 
an approach where shares are considered to be a method of tax administration. 
Another approach treats shares as a form of transfer from the state budget (i.e. 
a general subsidy). The spectrum of taxes in which shares are defined is very 
broad, but each solution has its advantages and disadvantages. One of the most 
serious drawbacks is that the system of ‘pure’ shares is not designed to compen‑
sate for disparities in the income of individual local government units, and thus 
may deepen disparities. Shared revenues may take different forms and involve 
substantially different degrees of local government autonomy, both with respect 
to the level of revenue and to the elements of the tax structure which they con‑
cern. In practice, they occur in three forms (Joumard, Kongsrud 2003, p. 184): 
as additions to state taxes; as shares in the taxes collected in the local govern‑
ment jurisdiction (in such a case, by promoting economic development, a local 
government has the possibility of influencing, albeit indirectly, the revenues 
from this form of shared income); and as shares in the revenues from a specific 
tax at the state level.
While the arguments justifying the necessity of ensuring a uniform tax sys‑
tem in the state are fully understandable, it is impossible not to notice the negative 
consequences of the considerably limited taxation power of local governments. 
Apart from the known consequences of a lack of financial independence, it should 
be pointed out that local politicians and decision‑makers are not financially or po‑
litically accountable to local voters. This is related to the problem of fiscal illusions 
in self‑government finance systems (Guziejewska 2016, pp. 483–489). Adverse 
consequences are also generated by relationships related to the so‑called ‘optimal 
scope’ of the local public sector. Unfortunately, such relationships are rarely dis‑
cussed in the Polish literature on the subject, though they are constantly present 
in the American literature. What is particularly stressed is the fact that the opti‑
mal scope and level of local goods and services is one for which the local com‑
munity is willing to pay in the form of local taxes and fees. It is very important 
to determine and know the preferences of the beneficiaries of local public services 
(Stiglitz 2004, pp. 888–897). 
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Fiscal decentralisation makes sense if local voters are able to disclose their 
preferences with regard to the type and extent of local public goods at a certain 
level of the local tax burden. The policy of shaping the level and structure of local 
government expenditures is based on three elements:
• the scope of the delegated own tasks and their cost‑absorption; 
• the ability to finance the tasks on the basis of the level of revenue which can 
be generated by the budget;
• the local community’s preferences as to the level and directions of spending. 
From a theoretical (but also practical) point of view, the last of these is in par‑
ticular an intellectually attractive element. The issue of public choice and disclo‑
sure of preferences in the public sector has long been of interest for theoreticians. 
It is also a huge challenge in terms of practical decisions, as can be evidenced 
by the recurrent issue of local referendums, or referendums on, for instance, Eu‑
ropean issues. 
The preferences for private and public goods are decided upon differently. 
As J.E. Stiglitz (2004, p. 185) pointed out, spending on private goods is measured 
by prices, while expenditures on public goods are shaped by complex political pro‑
cesses. There are, therefore, two main problems with the public resource allocation 
mechanism: disclosure of preferences and aggregation of preferences. In the sys‑
tems of representative democracy, it is a serious problem to determine the quantity 
and type of public goods that individual citizens prefer. An even greater challenge 
is posed by the practical aspects of aggregating preferences, which, according 
to the Nobel Prize winner mentioned above, boil down to issues such as different 
preferences of different individuals depending on their income and the tax system 
in the country (Stiglitz 2004, p. 191). The history of the public choice theory has 
come a very long way since the ancient Athenian and Roman democracies (Heck‑
elman, Miller 2015, p. 15), and yet there are still no satisfactory answers to many 
questions and problems related to the endless cycle of voting as a tool for reveal‑
ing preferences and making public (collective) decisions. To sum up, the theory 
does not provide a model for an ideal voting system that would provide information 
on the real preferences of citizens. Intuitive evidence suggests that local democra‑
cy and fiscal decentralisation should yield a more effective remedy to this problem 
than the centralisation of administration and public finance. 
Finding the right compromises and reaching, in practice, the right balance be‑
tween the legal and financial infrastructure characteristic of centralised and decen‑
tralised systems is a major challenge. Compromises are usually conditioned by po‑
litical interests, different national and local interests, and real social needs. The 
fiscal gap in local government revenue systems is defined as the difference between 
the various categories of own revenue and the budget expenditures to be covered. 
This gap is particularly unfavourable in a situation where most of the revenues 
of a local government unit are covered with external revenues, especially transfers 
from the state budget. This prevents flexible budgetary management, and often re‑
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sults in debt or a reduction in the financing of those public goods which are needed. 
In such a situation, it often happens that local decision‑makers and politicians are 
not held financially responsible to the local community. The consequence is a de‑
ficiency in the full and positive effects of decentralisation. 
The importance of financial independence and stability of the local gov‑
ernment sector has gained new importance following the global financial crisis 
of 2008. The analyses and discussions have noted that local and regional finance 
as an indispensable element of sustainable public finances and a certain buffer 
in crisis situations (Ahmad, Bordignon, Brosio, ed. 2016). On one hand, the legal 
and financial system of local government, the macroeconomic situation, and the 
sensitivity of local government finances to this situation determine the financial 
conditions of local governments. On the other hand, the legal and financial foun‑
dations of local government and its actual, current financial situation influence the 
financial situation in the entire public finance sector. Systems based to a large ex‑
tent on full fiscal decentralisation are less exposed to the negative consequences 
of the income shocks discussed above. 
4. Controversy over the assessment and measures of fiscal 
decentralisation – analysis based on the example of selected countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe
The essence of decentralisation is the self‑government of local and regional juris‑
dictions, and its basic condition is financial independence. The problem of fiscal 
autonomy and the financial independence of local government units and its bod‑
ies manifests itself in several groups of issues, which are determined by the fol‑
lowing elements:
• the amount of actual revenue of communes (or districts), including the 
so‑called own revenues (taxes);
• the extent and efficiency of the sources of such revenues;
• the real power and methods by which communes can influence an increase 
in revenues; 
• the extent and type of expenditures which may be effected by the com‑
mune;
• the possibility of incurring debt as part of financial autonomy and flexible fi‑
nancial management. 
Evaluation of the degree of fiscal decentralisation is a complex process in which 
the financial independence is assessed in terms of revenue and expenditure auton‑
omy. This relates to the actual capacity of local governments to shape both sides 
of the budget, and these processes are evolving in different directions in different 
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countries (Wildasin 1997, p. 14). P. Swianiewicz (2014, pp. 292–311) underlines 
the great difficulties in such assessments and categorisations of local government 
finance systems. He proposes a new classification of the local government finance 
systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, using such features as: 
• territorial structure;
• functional decentralisation (measured as the share of local government ex‑
penditure in GDP); 
• financial independence;
• horizontal power relations.
The analysis which used these criteria has resulted in the identification of five 
groups of countries: Group I consists of Poland, Hungary and Slovakia; Group II 
of the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia; Group III includes Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine; Group IV consists 
of Georgia, Lithuania and Serbia; and Group V of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 
author emphasizes the great diversity of these countries, which are often treated 
as homogenous, or at least similar to one another, and draws attention to the inad‑
equacy of “old” typologies. He puts Poland into the first group of countries, which 
he calls the ‘champions of decentralisation’. 
When assessing the fiscal autonomy (i.e. actual financial independence) 
of local government units, we use specific statistical measures and a compara‑
tive qualitative analysis. Statistical measures are popular due to their universal‑
ity, but a special role should be given to their construction and interpretation. 
In the case of comparative studies, it should be taken into account that pub‑
lic finance systems vary widely from country to country, both in terms of the 
degree of decentralisation and the construction of the tax system. This is par‑
ticularly true of local government finance systems, which have developed his‑
torically and are characterised by large national specificities. When using sta‑
tistical measures, the actual financial categories included in the numerator and 
denominator of the measure must be taken into account. This concerns in par‑
ticular the heterogeneous nature of revenue categories, such as ‘own revenues’ 
in individual countries, and the complex systems of subsidisation and financial 
compensation. Similar problems occur in the assessment of the expenditure 
side of the budget, as a wide range of expenditures does not necessarily prove 
a high degree of financial independence if these expenditures are covered main‑
ly with earmarked grants from the state budget. The multidimensional nature 
of the problem is evidenced by the figures in Tables 1 and 2 below. Table 1 pre‑
sents the shares of tax revenues at different tiers of government and the shares 
of social security contributions in the total tax revenues in the Visegrad Group 
Countries. As far as the local level is concerned, the countries with the high‑
est share of local taxes in tax and quasi‑fiscal revenues are the Czech Repub‑
lic and Poland. Viewed in this light, the local tax system and decentralisation 
are considerably weaker in Slovakia and Hungary. At the same time, the Czech 
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Republic is a country with a strong system of local taxes within the analysed 
years. In the cases of Slovakia and Hungary, however, it is possible to conclude 
that there are ongoing processes that weaken the financial foundations of local 
government.
Table 1. Tax revenue structure by level of government in the Visegrad Group Countries 
in 2004–2015 as the % of total taxation
Level of government 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poland
Central
government
49.2 50.2 50.1 52.4 53.2 51.1 52.7 52.4 49.8 48.7 48.5 48.1
Local government 12.8 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.5 13.1 12.6 12.3 12.6 12.6 12.9 12.9
Social security funds 37.9 36.8 35.7 34.1 32.9 35.5 34.4 34.9 37.3 38.3 38.2 38.5
EU institutions 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Czech Republic
Central
government
72.8 70.2 70.0 70.2 69.6 68.9 69.1 69.8 70.1 69.4 68.6 69.1
Local government 12.4 14.6 14.2 14.1 14.3 14.2 13.8 13.7 13.5 14.2 14.7 14.4
Social security funds 14.4 14.7 15.3 15.2 15.6 16.5 16.6 16.0 16.0 15.9 16.2 15.9
EU institutions 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
Slovakia
Central
government
55.5 58.8 58.2 58.2 58.6 54.9 54.7 55.3 54.1 53.9 54.9 55.9
Local government 4.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.6
Social security funds 40.1 38.4 38.9 38.8 39.4 42.0 42.1 41.5 42.8 43.2 42.2 41.9
EU institutions 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Hungary
Central
government
57.8 57.3 57.3 57.1 61.7 62.2 62.8 59.1 60.6 60.2 60.8 60.5
Local government 12.0 11.6 11.7 11.1 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.3 5.9 5.6 5.8
Social security funds 29.9 30.6 30.6 31.3 31.3 30.7 30.4 34.0 32.9 33.6 33.2 33.3
EU institutions 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Source: Data of taxation – European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, http://ec.europa. 
eu/taxation_customs/business/economic‑analysis‑taxation/data‑taxation_en (20.07.2017).
Similarly, a markedly different situation can be seen for the Baltic States, 
as shown in Table 2. Latvia, where local taxes account for over 19% of total tax 
revenue, is the only country that is characterised by a high share of local taxes 
in total tax revenue, which provides the local government with a significant means 
of financing from its own revenues. At the same time, both Lithuania and Estonia 
have a very low level of direct (which is the most important) sources of funding 
and weak foundations for fiscal decentralisation in the form of local taxes. The 
level of decentralisation and its direct bases in the form of local taxes are very dif‑
ferent in each of the countries analysed. 
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Table 2. Tax revenue structure by level of government in the Baltic Countries in 2004–2015 
as the % of total taxation
Level of government 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Lithuania
Central
government
66.7 67.6 67.9 67.8 66.9 56.4 56.4 57.0 57.7 57.8 57.4 57.5
Local government 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
Social security funds 31.2 30.2 30.1 30.2 30.9 41.3 41.1 40.6 40.0 39.9 40.1 39.8
EU institutions 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
Latvia
Central
government
51.9 54.2 54.4 53.7 51.8 47.2 47.9 48.7 50.0 50.8 51.1 51.5
Local government 17.7 16.7 16.9 17.9 19.0 18.4 20.6 19.5 19.1 19.1 19.4 19.3
Social security funds 30.0 28.4 28.0 27.8 28.7 33.9 31.0 31.2 30.4 29.7 29.0 28.6
EU institutions 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6
Estonia
Central government 83.8 83.0 84.0 83.8 82.0 81.5 80.3 80.4 80.8 81.7 81.9 82.3
Local government 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0
Social security funds 14.6 15.1 14.4 14.6 16.2 16.9 17.8 17.6 17.4 16.7 16.6 16.2
EU institutions 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Source: Data of taxation – European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, http://ec.europa.
eu/taxation_customs/business/economic‑analysis‑taxation/data‑taxation_en (20.07.2017).
In practice, a wide range of various statistical measures are used to assess 
financial independence and the autonomy of local government. Among the most 
commonly used are:
• the share of revenues of the local government sector in total public revenue;
• the share of expenditures of the local government sector in total public ex‑
penditure; 
• the share of own revenues in total revenue of local governments budgets; 
• the share of local taxes in total revenue;
• the scope of transfers from the central budget. 
The types and the specific legal and financial structure of transfers from the cen‑
tral budget are particularly important. The real problem is the heterogeneity of reve‑
nue categories and the difficulties in their allocation (OECD2013, Kim, Lotz, Bloch‑
liger (ed.), pp. 49–57). More specifically, problems are traditionally caused by the 
so‑called tax sharing. International comparisons are also hampered by difficult ac‑
cess to data and the wide variety of small taxes and local fees that exist in individ‑
ual countries. The overall scope of decentralisation based on the measures related 
to the expenditure side of public finances in presented in Table 3. The data showing 
the share of local government sub‑sector expenditures in GDP shows a relatively 
high level of spending autonomy for Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia. 
However, according to the figures in Table 2, for Estonia local financial expenditure 
is very low in terms of local taxes. The type of subsidies, general or earmarked, that 
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cover the expenditures of local government turns out to be decisive. Indeed, ear‑
marked grants of any kind limit both the individual unit’s revenue and expenditure 
autonomy. The data for Hungary, in turn, confirms previous observations regard‑
ing the presence of a strong process of centralising public finances in Hungary. 
Table 3. Local government subsector expenditure in selected countries of Central and East‑
ern Europe as the % of GDP
Years
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Poland 13.3 14.0 14.5 15.0 14.0 13.3 13.1 13.3 12.8 12.9
Czech Republic 10.4 10.5 11.6 11.3 12.3 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.4 10.2
Slovakia 6.1 6.1 7.3 7.3 6.8 6.4 6.4 6.7 7.5 6.6
Hungary 11.6 11.3 12,0 12.6 11.4 9,3 7.5 7.8 7.9 6.1
Lithuania 8.2 9.2 10.7 11.1 10.0 9.3 8.3 7.9 7.9 7.8
Latvia 10.3 11.8 12.6 12.0 10.8 9.9 10.2 10.0 9.3 9.6
Estonia 9.4 10.8 11.2 9.8 9.3 9.7 9.9 9.3 9.5 9.4
Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (20.07.2017).
A good measure of actual fiscal autonomy, in comparative analysis, is the 
share of local taxes in the GDP. The indicators for 2005–2015 are presented 
in Table 4. They demonstrate strong financial foundations in the form of local 
taxes for Poland, the Czech Republic and Latvia. It is only in these countries 
that we can therefore speak of a certain degree of fiscal decentralisation, and 
thus full decentralization. Decentralisation based mainly on transfers from the 
state budget should be considered as flawed, i.e. one that does not meet the basic 
postulate of the European Charter of Local Self‑Government and the requirements 
of science, both in the traditional approach to public finances and in the theory 
of fiscal federalism. 
Table 4. Taxes received by level of government as the % of GDP‑ local government in select‑
ed countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Years
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poland 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2
Czech Republic 4.3 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 5.0 5.0 5.0
Slovakia 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5
Hungary 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3
Lithuania 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Latvia 4.9 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.0 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6
Estonia 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Source: Taxation Trends in the European Union. Data for the EU Member States, Iceland and 
Norway, European Commission, DG Taxation and Customs Union, Edition 2017, p. 186. 
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At the end of this part of the discussion, it should be stressed once again that 
a great deal of caution is needed when using statistical, highly aggregated meas‑
ures of decentralisation and fiscal autonomy. The final assessment should take into 
account the specificities of individual countries, their historical and institutional 
conditions, and the specific characteristics of the whole system of public finances. 
A great deal of caution and attention should be paid to the actual content of the 
numerator and denominator of the individual measurements, as there are differ‑
ent classifications of individual sources of financing in different countries. In the 
countries where local government expenditure is financed with subsidies from the 
state budget, transfers from the central budget must be divided into general sub‑
sidies and earmarked grants. The measures and aggregated data presented above 
are a good tool for international comparisons and a starting point for a deeper as‑
sessment of individual systems. Qualitative evaluation should also be part of the 
final assessment. 
5. Conclusions
Both the theory of public finance in its traditional approach, which was developed 
in the unitary countries, and the fiscal federalism theory, which originated in the 
federal countries, postulate that the financing for local governments should have 
its sources in local taxes and fees. In today’s conditions, it is difficult to fulfil this 
requirement due to the large degree of decentralisation of public tasks and their 
high costs. The high fiscal decentralisation in the unitary countries does not fa‑
vour a uniform and effective tax system. It also results in a high degree of fiscal 
imbalance between individual territorial jurisdictions. These consequences result 
in the need to build a system of subsidizing local government which equalizes fi‑
nancial possibilities and ensures the same level of access to social services in the 
whole of the country. While acknowledging these conditions, however, it should 
be noted that in many Central and Eastern European countries the level of local 
taxes is marginal and there is undoubtedly room for fiscal decentralisation. The 
lack of any connection or marginal link between local decisions and local fiscal 
responsibility are dangerous from many points of view: political, economic and 
social. The discussion and proposals for reforming local government finance sys‑
tems should stress the need to grant sub‑central governments local taxing author‑
ity as an important source for financing their tasks. In practice, this implies a 20–
25% share of local taxes in total tax revenues in the country. On the other hand, 
the doctrine with respect to the prevailing share of local taxes in local government 
revenues seems unrealistic; nevertheless, it is still necessary to increase the impor‑
tance of local taxes and fees. Given the specificities of the unitary countries, their 
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traditions and already established financial systems, it seems reasonable to propose 
an increase in the efficiency of property taxes and a limited use of “additions” to in‑
come taxes. The latter solution is known in the literature. The system of “additions” 
to taxes consists of the fact that a given territorial community collects revenues 
as a result of an increase in the amount (addition) of the tax payable to the state. 
In the absence of an opportunity to increase the efficiency of property taxes, this 
could be an instrument that would combine local policy‑makers’ decisions on the 
amount of the tax burden at the local level with the expenditure at this level. 
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Streszczenie
NORMATYWNE VERSUS POZYTYWNE UJĘCIE 
DECENTRALIZACJI FISKALNEJ A MIERNIKI 
DECENTRALIZACJI. ANALIZA NA PRZYKŁADZIE 
WYBRANYCH KRAJÓW EUROPY ŚRODKOWO‑WSCHODNIEJ
W artykule podjęto problem rozdźwięku pomiędzy zaleceniami teorii finansów publicz‑
nych w różnych nurtach a procesami decentralizacji w praktyce. Analiza ma charakter 
teoretyczno‑empiryczny. Celem rozważań jest przedstawienie dorobku teoretycznego po‑
święconego decentralizacji fiskalnej wraz ze wskazaniem na zalecenia doktryny i skon‑
frontowanie ich z tendencjami w praktyce finansów samorządowych w Polsce i wybra‑
nych krajach Europy Środkowo‑Wschodniej. W rozważaniach wykorzystano literaturę 
przedmiotu jak również opracowania instytucji międzynarodowych, dane Eurostatu oraz 
Komisji Europejskiej. Analizie komparatystycznej poddano dwie grupy państw: państwa 
Grupy Wyszehradzkiej oraz 3 kraje nadbałtyckie. Kraje te znacznie różnią się jeśli cho‑
dzi o zakres decentralizacji fiskalnej. Za najbardziej satysfakcjonujący proces ten moż‑
na uznać na Łotwie, w Czechach i Polsce. W zakończeniu sfomułowano rekomendacje 
szerszego wykorzystania podatków od nieruchomości oraz tzw. dodatków do podatków 
państwowych.
Słowa kluczowe: finanse publiczne, decentralizacja fiskalna, samorząd terytorialny, 
autonomia fiskalna
